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and atrocities of this century, inviting us to think
creatively about which legal responses might be appropriate and effective. The book weaves together the
terrible facts of the age-from the two world wars up
to the recent genocides and war crimes in the Balkans
and Rwanda-with a lucid account of the steady
development of international criminal law. Tracing
two centuries of legal evolution, the book makes a
strong case for international criminal justice. Neier's
narrative history of this war-riven century, it should
also be said, is well crafted and easily accessible to a
general audience.
War Crimes moves on two levels: it proceeds in
chronological fashion, reviewing historical cases and
then moving forward to contemporary controversies,
including firsthand accounts of the author's personal
involvement as the former director of Human Rights
Watch. It also proceeds on an analytical level, as it
identifies and evaluates problem areas in the criminallaw responses to atrocity, such as the punishmentamnesty debate or the problem of how to ascribe
responsibility to individuals in the context of mass
murder and systemic repression.
The book's great merit lies in Neier's ability to
identify plausible legal responses to actual atrocities.
But the very force of its narrative raises a paradox that
the book itself does not completely resolve. Given a
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fifty-year forward march of international human-rights
norms, how can we explain the seemingly unending
perpetration of war crimes and atrocities? The power
of Neier's narrative inevitably casts a shadow over his
hopes and ours for international criminal justice. In
the context of recurring hostilities, what can the international community expect from criminal law? To
what extent is international criminal law a proportionate response to the grim reality of human-rights
abuses? Is it an effective way to handle the problem or
a symbolic gesture, the expression of an aspiration?
And what underlying purposes are served by the
international criminal-law response to human-rights
abuses? This last question defies any simple answer.
Neier argues in favor of individual trials for war
crimes, even though he admits that such trials are
often held for the "wrong reason." He makes this
argument in a chapter dealing with the Balkans
conflict, tided "Calling for a Tribunal, the Right Deed
for the Wrong Reason?" The case for the ad hoc
tribunal preceded the peace. Rationalized in terms of
the peace, the tribunal was established at the behest of
the Security Council. Neier interestingly compares
the post-World War II trials with the current Balkan
war-crimes proceedings convened in The Hague.
Because they followed a substantial Allied intervention, the postwar trials have been criticized as
examples of "victors' justice." Yet, if the contribution
to peace of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia is more controversial, this is because its
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organizers did not intervene decisively in the region.
Today, those who would try war crimes apparently
want victors' justice without having first achieved a
battlefield victory.
The heinous massacres that were perpetrated at
Srebrenica, in any case, took place after the tribunal's
establishment, casting doubt on its effectiveness as a
deterrent. Furthermore, as Neier correctly observes,
invocations of "peace" in this context sound, at least
in part, like a pretext for avoiding action, given the
international community's failure to intervene effectively in the conflict in the first place. If the tribunals,
and international criminal law more generally, are
justified as means to deter ongoing violence, as this
book's narrative suggests, to what extent can international legal responses be undertaken without regard to
the politics-on-the-ground? Might there not be
circumstances (such as we find in the Balkans in the
1990s) where, given the political realities of a negotiated peace agreement, criminal proceedings may well
be destabilizing and therefore antithetical to a future
turn toward liberal democracy?
Where War Crimes addresses this question, it
endorses the aims of "legalism," the aim of espousing
adherence to the rule of law (p. 222). The purposes of
international criminal justice are always forwardlooking. They have little to do with the traditional
retributive purposes of the criminal law. Yet, if the
purpose of war-crimes trials is to emphasize the
consequences that flow from actions, then the question shifts to what exactly the criminal law is doing,
here, that could not be accomplished by some other
means. When legal proceedings are convened in the
midst of political violence, as in the Balkans, the mere
promise of a trial is unlikely to restore or reinforce the
rule of law. What is more, this promise may even be
used-as Neier observes-as a pretext to avoid more
effective measures. This suggests that "justice,"
however desirable in itself, must sometimes yield to
other more pressing moral aims, such as averting
catastrophe and human suffering.
In a chapter dealing with individual responsibility in situations of systemic repression, Neier again
takes up the question of norms in deciding what ought
to be the priorities in punishment policy. The issue has
arisen in the ad hoc tribunals adjudicating atrocities in
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the Balkans and Rwanda, where Neier advocates
going after those with the "highest responsibility for
the most egregious crimes" (p. 214). This normative
principle seems right, so long as it is interpreted in a
broader policy context. For instance, where the stated
purposes of the tribunal are to bring peace and establish the rule of law, prosecutions may be justified only
so long as they advance stability in the region.
In the second half of the book, some of the other
purposes and values of international criminal justice
come into focus, such as its important role in representing (in the sense of re-presenting), or drawing
public attention to, the political violence of this
century. That is one indirect consequence of international criminal law's adjudication of human-rights
violations as "war crimes," "crimes against humanity,"
and "genocide." This issue is raised in a chapter
devoted to the treatment of rape under international
criminal law, which provides a thorough summary
both of rape's use as an instrument of terror in war and
of the growing recognition of it as a war crime under
international humanitarian law. Despite the contemporary movement for expanding new human-rights
law in this area, Neier correctly observes that rape has
long been recognized as a war crime under international humanitarian law. Nevertheless, he argues
against prosecuting rape in the Balkans as "genocide,"
apparently out of a concern for dilution of the law. He
sometimes suggests that his objection to genocidalrape prosecutions is merely evidentiary (p. 187), while,
in other places, the basis for his hesitation appears to
run deeper (p. 191). But rape in Bosnia appears to have
been used in an attempt to destroy an ethnic group, as
a method of "ethnic cleansing." This strongly suggests
that it should be prosecuted as a "crime against
humanity." Rape policy mediates at the intersection of
race and gender. When rape operates, as it did in the
Balkans, both to violate women and to destroy an
ethnic group, it could furnish arguably the basis for a
charge of genocide.
The development of contemporary international
criminal case law, concerning sexual violence in
contemporary armed conflicts, illuminates the intimate connection between human-rights politics and
law. The very architecture of the normative law, here,
is inextricably entwined with political violence on the

ground, since international criminal law has become a
mechanism for public recognition, albeit after the fact,
of the victims' right to equal protection. This is, incidentally, a purpose that Neier endorses (p. 22).
Understanding this "mirroring" or awareness-building
function of international criminal law helps to resolve
the paradox of how a growing international consensus
on the normative binding power of rights could have
been accompanied by an increase in the very atrocities
that the apparatus seeks to publicize or represent.
To what extent does international criminal justice
offer a "liberal" response to the horrors of contemporary persecution and injustice? Insofar as international
criminal justice offers a small degree of individual
accountability, it affirms a core feature of the liberal
state. But today's international criminal-justice system
lacks the support, in places like Rwanda and Bosnia, of
established democratic national structures. The rule of
law can never be fully stabilized from abroad, and
without domestic support. Neier understands this quite
well. The international criminal justice that he
eloquently advocates therefore reflects a thin, procedural conception of the rule of law, although it is one
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that is evocative of a more substantive ideal of justice.
International criminal accountability offers the hope of
outcomes agreeable to a liberal outlook, despite
extraordinary circumstances and the unavailability of a
genuine, locally supported rule of law. Even a thin rule
of law, under international auspices, would appear to be
better than its utter absence. Nevertheless, the danger
of such gestures is that they may reduce justice to a
principle of equal protection that is applied only
symbolically and ex post facto, without requiring any
serious humanitarian intervention on the part of the
international community. Hence we need to exercise
caution in entrenching international criminal law as
our main technique for enforcing human rights. For if
we just settle for the rule of law in extraordinary
circumstances, we risk lowering our sights and
forfeiting a more robust sense of justice and liberal
democratic identity.
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